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BOOK REVIEWS
THE LAW OF HIGHER EDUCATION:

LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF AD-

By William A. Kaplin.* San
Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers. 1978. Pp. xxvii, 500. $18.95.
MINISTRATIVE DECISION MAKING.

1980. By William A. Kaplin.*
San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers. 1980. Pp. xxii, 184. $13.95.
THE LAW OF HIGHER EDUCATION

Reiewed by Edward Mcann afly, Jr.**
There was a time not so long ago when administrators of colleges and universities would not need books like those under review.
Students could count it a privilege to attend college, but had few, if
any, enforceable rights.' College administrators could dismiss students at will, even at whim, 2 without answering to a court for their
actions. Judges frequently deferred to these decisions by holding that
the power of administrators to sanction students was similar to, if not
identical with, that of parents over their children. 3 By now, however,
the law has arrived on the campus, even if, like "a blanket of ground
fog" (p. vii). 4 After a flurry of cases in the past two decades expanding the due process rights of students, at least in public institutions,5 this trend may have been halted by the Burger Court in Board
*

Professor of Law, Catholic University of America School of Law.

Director, Center for Constitutional Studies; Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame
Law School. The reviewer wishes to disclose that he took a course in education law from
Professor Kaplin at Catholic Unversity of America School of Law and that Professor Kaplin
serves on the Advisory Board of the Center for Constitutional Studies.
I See, e.g., Hamilton v] Regents of the Univ. of Calif, 293 U.S. 245 (1934) (upholding
mandatory military training, even for conscientious objectors, as a condition of attending a
public university).
2 See, e.g., Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y.S. 435 (1928) (upholding dismissal of student solely on the ground that she was not a "typical Syracuse girl").
3 Gott v. Berea College, 156 Ky. 376, 161 S.W. 204 (1913) (affirming authority of college
officials to enforce rules of student discipline issued by college acting zin
loco parentir). But see
Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908) (state statute prohibiting a private college
from teaching black and white students together held not to violate equal protection).
4 Professors of law should probably not complain too loudly about lack of clarity in
judicial opinions such as Horowitz, for when courts cannot make up their collegial minds and
communicate their decisions clearly to people who have an interest in these decisions there is
a correspondingly higher demand for law professors to rush into the breach to offer their
explanations and comments on the court's performance.
5 See, e.g., Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961) (mandat-

BOOK REVIEWS

[Vol. 57:682]

of Curators v. Horowitz,6 which signalled that procedural due process
rights for academic dismissals may be significantly less than in sanctions for misconduct.
Horowitz graphically illustrates the need for thoughtful commentary on higher education law: endless expansion of constitutional
rights has gone the way of the in loco parentis doctrine. After the demise of the various immunities that colleges, like other charitable institutions, used to enjoy, and with the dramatic proliferation of
federal, state, and local regulation of higher education over the past
two decades, college and university administrators need to be aware
of the complex and even conflicting demands of the law in their
decisionmaking.
In The Law of HigherEducation.- Legal Implications ofAdministrative
Decision Making and its 1980 supplement, The Law ofHigher Education
1980,7 Professor Kaplin provides helpful comment on a wide variety
of legal matters ranging from contracts to student athletics.8 Some
legal issues that may concern college administrators are dealt with
summarily. For example, the new copyright law receives less than a
half page of comment (p. 143). In addition, Professor Kaplin does
not discuss a few issues such as patent law and regulations governing
human subject research. These issues may well be omitted because
they arise almost exclusively at large research universities which are
typically well served by in-house counsel. The comprehensive list of
topics that Kaplin does treat, however, makes this work a valuable
guide to almost every aspect of higher education law for lawyers, administrators, and students.
I.

A Reference Work for College Counsel

First, Kaplin attempts to reach "legal counsel who deal with the
ing adequate notice and fair hearing before expulsion of public college students for
misconduct).
6 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
7 References to the main volume will be by page number only, while those to the supplement will be preceded by "Supp."
8 The full list of topics covered includes: tort, contract and civil rights liability of college
trustees, administrators and their agents; collective bargaining on campus; non-discrimination in employment and affirmative action; procedural requirements in faculty termination
and student discipline; academic freedom and tenure in an era of retrenchment; student
admissions and financial aid; general principles relating to student demonstrations, student
organizations, student press, student housing, student athletics, student files and records and
student voting; zoning and land use regulation; taxation and exempt status; access of the
public to the campus; state licensing, chartering and other forms of regulation; and
accreditation.
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multitude of new challenges and complexities that arise from the
law's presence on campus" (p. vii). Kaplin is well equipped for this
task, having served for several years as editor of the Journalof College
and Universipy Law, published by the National Association of College
and University Attorneys. The only practitioner I am aware of who
has reviewed the first volume, Brock Hornby, has expressed generous
praise for Kaplin's work: "[T]he literature on higher education undoubtedly achieves a new level of maturity with the publication of
[this] volume." 9 Hornby, however, has expressed doubt that Kaplin
has succeeded in providing college counsel with the kind of tool they
need:
The Kaplin text is too generalized a treatment for a practitioner's
ready use. Higher Education law is subject to so many statutes and
regulations and covers so wide a universe that it is not amenable to
a Prosser or Restatement-type treatment to which a lawyer may
respond confidently. Moreover, . . . even with the promise of an-

nual supplements [this book cannot] keep pace with the fastmoving
developments. '0
According to Hornby, what practitioners need is a new reporting service on higher education law that would focus "on the practical details a lawyer needs."' "I Hornby does not specify those details
in his review, and in fairness to Kaplin it should be noted that many
of the practical suggestions for college and university administrators
referred to later in this review' are equally useful for college counsel.
Moreover, Kaplin is careful to point out that his suggestions are necessarily general, in character and that more specific guidance should
be sought -from competent counsel:
The legal analyses and suggestions, of necessity, are general: they
are not adapted to the law of any particular state or to the circumstances prevailing to any particular postsecondary institution.
Thus the book is not a substitute for the advice of legal counsel, for
further research into primary legal resources, or for individualized
study of each legal problem's specific circumstances. Nor is the
book necessarily the latest word on the law. There is a saying
among lawyers that "the law must be stable but it cannot stand
still," and the law is moving especially fast in its applications to
postsecondary education. Thus administrators and counsel will
9 Hornby, Book Review, 7 J. C. & U.L. 181, 184 (1980).
10 Id
11 Id at p. 185. Hornby suggests that "the market of lawyers' law firms who counsel
institutions of higher education has. . . finally grown large enough to justify economically a
treatment of the subject avowedly for lawyers." Id at 185 n.7.
12 See text accompanying notes 23-26 infra.
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want to keep abreast of ongoing developments concerning the issues
in this book (p. ix).
Kaplin repeats this caution throughout the first volume (pp. 26, 43,
66, 95, 128, 161) and in the introduction to the supplement (Supp., p.

xi).
Although Hornby may be right in urging the creation of a new
reporting service on higher education law, in the meantime Kaplin's
supplemental volume is useful. The supplement follows the organization of the 1978 volume and uses the same designations for chapters, sections and subsections, for easy cross reference.' 3 If a critical
note is to be sounded on the supplement process, it is that Kaplin
does not always make good on his promise that the discussions in the
supplement "do not just collect and explain recent developments;
they also identify relationships between them, analyze the impact of

recent developments on existing law, and identify emerging issues
and trends that deserve the attention of postsecondary administrators
and legal counsel in the near future" (Supp., p. xi). The very nature
of the supplement process - to include a comment on each major
development up to press time - may make this promise extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to fulfill. If so, as Kaplin advises college
administrators concerning promises to students (p. 187), such a
promise ought not be made.
The treatment of the major developments reported in the supplement is not as helpful as the more suggestive commentary on parallel material in the first volume. For example, Kaplin's treatment of
Bakke,14 although obviously Written under the pressure of meeting
16
the publisher's deadline,1 5 masterfully explains a confusing decision

and presents clear guidelines for college administrators to follow in
fashioning student admission policies (pp. 202-211).

By contrast,

13 I am puzzled by Kaplin's suggestion that the supplement is "sufficiently self-contained
to be used independently" (Supp., p. xi). Although the later volume can be read from cover
to cover as an update on higher education law, the format presumes almost constant reference
to the earlier volume, and the contents of the supplement (covering legal developments from
mid-1978 to the end of 1979) limit its utility as an independent source of higher education
law. Because the supplement is valuable only as a companion to the main volume, the publishers ought to contemplate producing a cheaper paper edition that could be discarded when
the original volume is thoroughly edited to include the developments reported in the supplement and in subsequent supplemental volumes. Kaplin's textbook on education law (see note
27 infra) uses a loose-leaf format that presumably makes subsequent editing less costly. A
similar format might be contemplated for future editions of the volumes under review here.
14 Bakke v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Calif., 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
15 Kaplin referred to the Supreme Court decision in the U.S. Law Week edition.
16 Kaplin notes that "The justices wrote six opinions, none of which commanded a majority of the court" (p. 205).
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Kaplin's treatment of Weber' 7 consists mainly of lengthy excerpts
from Justice Brennen's opinion (Supp., pp. 41-49) and brief reports of
the concurring opinion of Justice Blackmun and the dissents of Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist (Supp., p. 49). The most veluable part of Kaplin's discussion of Weber, his application of that decision to the context of higher education, is. all too brief (Supp., pp. 5152).
Hornby's observation about the rapidly changing character of
higher education law is borne out by Kaplin's treatment of the controversial Yeshiva decision,"' which is limited to excerpts from the
opinion of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals (Supp., pp. 11-19).
College administrators and college counsel will have to await the
next supplement before getting Professor Kaplin's practical suggestions on the tension between faculty collective bargaining and collegiality. Kaplin's treatment of Catholic Bishop of Chicago 19 follows his
pattern of reprinting generous portions of the Supreme Court's opinion (Supp., pp. 20-24), but also contains a valuable discussion of the
limited impact that Kaplin thinks this case will have on postsecondary education (Supp., pp. 25-26).
A similar disproportion between text (Supp., pp. 87-96) and
commentary (Supp., pp. 35-37, 96-98 and 146-148) characterizes
Kaplin's treatment of Davis,20 in which the Supreme Court dealt inconclusively with the requirement that institutions receiving federal
funds refrain from discriminating against qualified handicapped individuals. Kaplin's treatment of Krotkoff,2 dealing with termination
of employment of tenured professors because of financial exigency,
consists of twelve pages of the opinion of the appellate court (Supp.,
pp. 63-75) and one scant paragraph of commentary, in which administrators and counsel are told laconically to be "sensitive to Krotkofs
many possibile applications" (Supp., p. 75).
On the positive side, the supplement carefully reports the major
developments in federal regulation of higher education that occurred
during the Carter Administration: the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission regulations concerning discrimination on the basis
of pregnancy (Supp., p. 33); HEW's regulations concerning age discriminaton (Supp., pp. 98-100), affirmative action programs (Supp.,
pp. 100-04), sex discriminaton in collegiate athletic programs (Supp.,
17
18
19
20
21

United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
Krotkoff v. Goucher College, 585 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1978).
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pp. 150-58); and the Veterans Administration rules concerning benefits for veteran students (Supp., p. 107). Kaplin refers briefly to an
article exploring the limits of federal regulatory authority over higher
education (Supp., p. 142). The Reagan Administration's change in
attitude about this matter will undoubtedly be reported in subsequent supplements, and one might expect Kaplin to refer his readers
22
to more of the scholarly literature on this theme as well.
In my judgment, The Law of tHgher Education and its supplement
provide college and university administrators with a clear and readable guide through the complex maze of regulations governing the
institutions they serve. Although Hornby may be correct in suggesting that Kaplin has not met all the needs of attorneys advising
college and university administrators on legal problems, no author
should be faulted for failing to write .a book someone else has in
mind. Moreover, this treatise is an excellent starting place for college
counsel researching legal problems facing colleges or universities.
The carefully selected bibliography at the end of each chapter, for
example, contains enough resources to enable these attorneys to carry
out their research well.
II.

Tool For Preventive Legal Planning

College and university administrators need not be overawed by
the range of issues addressed in the Kaplin volumes, for the treatment of these issues is, for the most part, not so technical as to be of
use only to lawyers. Indeed, the author indicates in the preface to the
first volume that his principal goal is to provide administrators with
a clear picture of the requirements of the law, so that they may plan
effectively to avoid needless litigation or respond deftly to specific
legal problems when they arise (p. xii).
In my judgment, Kaplin succeeds admirably in achieving this
goal. He provides a top-quality guide for those who need guidance
through the maze of federal, state, and local regulation of nearly
22

See, e.g., E.

GAFFNEY

& P.

CAMPUS: FEDERAL REGULA(1982); SLOAN COMMISSION ON
A PROGRAM FOR RENEWED PARTNERSHIP (1980);

MOOTS, GOVERNMENT AND

TION OF RELIGIOUSLY AFFILIATED HIGHER EDUCATION

GOVERNMENT AND HIGHER EDUCATION,

H.

EDWARDS, HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE UNHOLY CRUSADE AGAINST GOVERNMENTAL

REGULATION (1980); Shils, ovenment and Universities in the UnitedStates, 17 MINERVA 129-77

(1979); Gaffney, The Constitutionandthe Campus: The CaseforInstitutionalIntegrity and the Needfor
CriticalSd-Evaluation, in CHURCH AND COLLEGE: A VITAL PARTNERSHIP (J. MOSELY ed.
1980); Durham & Oaks, ConstitutionalProtectionsforIndependent HigherEducation.: Limited Powers
and InstitutionalRights, Id.; Oaks, A Private Univerrity Looks at Government Regulation, 4 J. C. &
U. L. 1 (1976); O'Neil, Cod and Government at Yale; The Limis of FederalRegulation of Higher
Education, 44.U. CIN. L. REV. 525 (1975).
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every aspect of higher education. Because he does not assume that
his readers have formal legal training, he explains complex legal doctrines in clear language. For example, he states succinctly the principal elements of the law on contracts, negligence, and defamation (pp.
57-67). Complicated areas of federal regulation such as the regulations concerning nondiscrimination on the basis of handicap (pp.
192-93) are similarly well-handled. Kaplin deserves special commendation for his ability to translate the confusing rules of affirmative
action into crisp, understandable suggestions for evaluating an institution's student admission and financial aid policies (pp. 202-11, 21920).
Just as medical patients should see a doctor not simply when
they are ill, so also colleges and universities should practice preventive law. On this model, a college or university would not wait until
it is sued, but would comprehensively review its policies to ensure
that, to the best of its knowledge, it complied with the law. Kaplin's
work, as well as that of Kent M. Weeks, 23 would serve college administrators well in accomplishing this task.
The Kaplin volumes are replete with useful suggestions addressed to college and university administrators. In an early chapter
of the first volume, for example, these administrators are given advice
concerning the scope of their authority and that of the officers, employees and organizations with whom they deal:
They should understand where their authority comes from and
which higher-level administrators may review or modify their acts
and decisions. They should attempt to resolve unnecessary gaps or
ambiguities in their authority. They should consider what part of
their authority may and should be subdelegated to lower-level administrators and what checks or limitations should be placed on
those delegations. And they should attempt to assure that their authority is adequately understood by those members of the campus
community with whom they deal (p. 43).
In the introductory chapter setting forth an overview of postsecondary education law, Kaplin suggests that since the law governing the constitutionality of federal and state support of church23

In 1981 the Center for Constitutional Studies at the Notre Dame Law School pub-

lished a LEGAL INVENTORY FOR INDEPENDENT COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES (1981), edited
by Kent M. Weeks; and followed in 1982 with LEGAL DESKBOOK FOR ADMINISTRATORS OF
INDEPENDENT COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES, also edited by Weeks. Although these publica-

tions may not be precisely what Hornby had in mind for practitioners, they provide new tools
both for preventive planning and for responding directly to litigation or administrative
proceedings as they arise. The LEGAL DESKBOOK will be supplemented regularly to keep up
to date with changes in statutes, regulations, and applicable case law.

[Vol. 57:682]

BOOK REVIEWS

related education remains somewhat unsettled, administrators of
church-related colleges and universities should exercise great care in
using government funds (p. 33). To urge caution and prudence is, of
course, commendable, but in my judgment the example Kaplin offers
is not very helpful. None of my research on federal regulation of
church-related colleges 24 suggests that administrators there think
that they can use federal funds "to build a chapel or purchase religious texts for a divinity school" (p. 33). Kaplin rightly observes that
"state constitutions or the statutes creating the funding programs
may contain clauses which restrict government support for churchrelated institutions more vigorously than the estatishment clause
33).
does" (p.

Kaplin tells administrators that the surest way to limit an institution's contractual liability is by careful advance planning of lines of
authority (pp. 66-67). He also advises them on the avoidance, control, and transfer of liability (pp. 79-84).
Kaplin insists that "there is no matgic machete which postsecondary administrators can use to cut through the equal employment
thicket" and that the challenge presented by this area of the law is
"not one for amateurs" (p. 128). He recommends that colleges and
universities have equal employment officers who are qualified specialists on the subject and that legal counsel work with these specialists in formulating general policies on this matter, to assure "not
merely that some nondiscriminatory reason can be given for each
employment decision but that discrimination played no part in any
decision" (p. 128).

Colleges and universities often have written standards to guide
the judgment of administrators in faculty personnel decisions. If
these standards are not meant to bind the institution legally, Kaplin
urges administrators to include language clarifying that limitation
within the standards (p. 129). Kaplin likewise urges administrators

to review carefully the procedural safeguards afforded personnel
before terminating or suspending job benefits (p. 141).

Since courts often look to classic statements on academic freedom and tenure, such as the 1940 Statement of Principles issued by
the Association of American Colleges and the American Association
of University Professors, Kaplin cautions administrators to determine
whether similar documents have been incorporated into faculty contracts (p. 141).
24 See E. GAFFNEY & P. MooTs, GOVERNMENT AND CAMPUs: FEDERAL REGULATION
OF RELIGIOUSLY AFFILIATED HIGHER EDUCATION 101-122 (1982).
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Kaplin urges college administrators facing the financial troubles
of retrenchment to plan ahead to avoid, where possible, legal difficulties that could arise if financial pressures require staff reductions. Although Kaplin's comments on financial exigency are necessarily
general, they are not so vague as to leave administrators wondering
what he means by "planning ahead". Kaplin suggests that administrators establish concrete standards for determining when a financial
exigency exists and for identifying which faculty positions will be terminated. To avoid possible lawsuits, writes Kaplin, administrators
should keep complete records of their standards and decisions in this
sensitive area (pp. 168-69).
In an era of increased sensitivity to consumer protection, Kaplin
advises college administrators to review all bulletins and catalogues
that may contain institutional rules and policies affecting students.
Kaplin urges college administrators to consider adopting a code of
fair dealing with students, but advises administrators to use language
suggesting a promise to students only when the institution is prepared to live up to the promise (pp. 181-82).
Some institutions disclose their standards and criteria governing
student admissions. Kaplin observes that some courts have adopted
a contract theory that binds institutions to honor their published policies in deciding whom to accept or reject. Without advising administrators whether to publish institutional criteria for student
admissions, Kaplin notes that published policies should state only
what the institution is willing to abide by (pp. 186-87).
Kaplin notes a judicial trend towards upholding most rules governing student conduct, 25 but cautions that such rules, at private aswell as at public institutions, should convey a "sufficiently definite
warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common
understanding and practices." Kaplin suggests that student involvement in drafting such regulations may be valuable to ensure an expression of their common understanding, but adds that a lawyer
should review drafts of student discipline regulations (pp. 232-33).
Kaplin writes that the distinction between private and public
institutions of higher education does not necessarily mean that a
"student stands procedurally naked before the authority of the [private] school" (p. 249); instead, he suggests that courts are tending to
25 Jenkins v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 506 F.2d 992 (5th Cir. 1975); Sword v. Fox,
446 F.2d 1091 (4th Cir. 1971); Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir.
1969). But see Soglin v. Kauffman, 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969).
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give increased protection to students at private institutions.2 6 If,
however, a private college decides not to provide the procedural safeguards constitutionally required of public institutions, Kaplin suggests that the private college administrators reflect this choice clearly
in the college rules "so as to inhibit a court from finding such procedures implicit in the rules or in the student-institution relationship"
(p. 251).
If college and university administrators follow
the practical
suggestions Kaplin makes throughout his volume, they would be going a long way toward ensuring that their institutions comply with
the requirements of the law and would thereby prevent a great deal
of needless and costly litigation.
III. A Supplement For Courses on Law and Education
As the above comments suggest, the legal rules governing education are now so dense and complicated that these materials are studied by both law students and graduate education students. Kaplin
co-authored a leading casebook on education law2 7 and teaches such
a course at the law school at Catholic University of America. Understandably, then, he intended Law ofH'gher Education to reach not only
college and university administrators, but also "students and observers of higher education and law who desire to explore the intersection
of these two disciplines" (p. vii).

Anyone who teaches a law and education course, whether in law
school or in a school of education, should own a copy of Kaplin's
book and refer to it often throughout the course. Students with a
special interest in higher education law might also find these volumes
worth purchasing. I doubt, however, whether many professors of education law would find Law of Hzgher Education suitable for use as a
textbook. It probably would make a better supplement to courses on
law and education. Nonetheless, Kaplin has provided a valuable
supplement for all who teach and study education law. In 1978, The
Law of Hgher Education won the Borden Award from the American
Council on Education for the year's most valuable book concerning
higher education. I think Kaplin richly deserved this award.

See Slaughter v. Brigham Young Univ., 514 F.2d 622 (10th Cir. 1975).
W. KAPLIN, M. SORGEN, P. DUFFY & E. MARGOLIN, STATE, SCHOOL AND FAMILY:
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND EDUCATION (2d ed. 1979).
26
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